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The Great Rehearsal
"Let us raise a standard to which
the wise and honest can repair; the




The undersigned participated, in the autumn of 1972, in an international
law seminar at the School of Law at the University of Texas at Austin. At
the first meeting, they decided to take as their objective to work out the
minimum changes in the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of
the International Court of Justice that would revive world interest in both
bodies, and give them at least a chance of becoming what was hoped for
them in 1945: a powerful force for keeping the peace.
The undersigned considered approaching this by role-playing, assigning
each member of the group to represent a given state or group of states.
However, it was feared that this would make agreements extremely
difficult to reach (i.e., it would be too much like reality!), so it was decided
to sit as a drafting committee of the whole, with different members acting
as rapporteurs for different parts of the task.
Attached is the result. It has been hard work, but it has been stimulating
and the authors have learned a great deal. If it is of any interest to others,
the authors will be well repaid.
Two or three meetings were enough to convince the group that they
were going to fall far short of the goal set and attained at the "Great
Rehearsal" in Philadelphia in 1787. (The reference of course is to the title
of Carl Van Doren's book and its thesis.) They simply could not envisage
an even remotely acceptable way to make the United Nations into a true
world government, with a true legislative branch enacting laws that would
*Woodfin L. Butte is Professor of Law at the University of Texas at Austin. The ten
other participants were second- or third-year law students who were enrolled in the seminar
under the general direction of Professor Butte.
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be binding on all states and their citizens. The judiciary branch was rela-
tively simple. The executive branch required little modification of the
existing Security Council. But the legislative branch stumped the group.
The Security Council seemed to the authors to be plainly executive in
make-up, purposes and power. Trying to recast it as the upper house of a
bi-cameral legislature would have been a radical alteration of its functions,
and would have forced the drafting committee to create a new executive
branch, presumably by enlarging the powers of the Secretary General. Nor
is the Security Council adequately representative of all the members to be
an upper house of a national legislature.
Keeping the Security Council as the executive was discussed, but
making it responsible to the General Assembly, as in states with a parlia-
mentary system. But here the group ran head on into the problem that
plagued them throughout, as indeed it fatally plagues the present orga-
nization of the United Nations: the absurdly "unequal equality" in the
General Assembly of every Member, with Guyana having the same voting
power as Great Britain, Uganda the same vote as the United States, and
Senegal the same vote as the Soviet Union.
Nor would the inspired compromise of 1787 work here. Dividing the
unicameral General Assembly into two chambers, with voting strength in
one distributed by population, and in the other equally to all states, pro-
duced completely unacceptable results, with some of the world's most
advanced states relegated to voting inferiority to some of the most primi-
tive and impoverished.
So, reluctantly, the true world government was given up, not as unde-
sirable, but as unattainable either by way of amending the existing struc-
ture or by gaining unanimous acceptance of a new Charter.
This decision taken, it followed that the drafters would not try to insert
into the Charter anything like the United States' Bill of Rights. They did
not however feel completely defeated here. Many of the protections of the
Bill of Rights are at least findable in the Preamble and Article I of the
Charter; and if enlargement of the competence of the International Court
of Justice is successful, a jurisprudence may evolve which would serve the
same purpose.
The group turned then to the task of strengthening those provisions
which have not proved adequate to enable the United Nations to attain its
first stated Purpose: "To maintain international peace and security."
Here a number of things were done:
First of all, access to the International Court of Justice was made
easy- even mandatory- and its jurisdiction compulsory, and the Security
Council was required to provide means for the enforcement of the Court's
orders and decisions.
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Second, the Security Council voting rule which permits a veto by one
permanent member was changed to a more balanced rule which allows a
veto by any three members. The permanent members ought not to object
to this: if there is any merit in their opposition to a proposal, they ought to
be able to persuade two other members to join with them to block it. And it
is hoped that this change will put an end to the current practice under
which a permanent member will block a vote on a cease-fire until its client
state has won.
Third, and most important, for a standing peacekeeping force under the
immediate command of the Secretary General was provided. This force
will be made up of national contingents seconded to the UNPF on rotating
three-year assignments. The unworkable, paralyzing "Military Staff Com-
mittee of the present Charter is discarded, and the military Commander of
the UNPF will establish his own staff and command organization.
The authors eliminated, at least as an absolute, the requirement of
consent of the state in which the peace-keeping force is to operate. And
although the Secretary General is always to be subject to control by the
Security Council, the group built in "fail-safe" provisions under which
delay or inaction by the Security Council will not block his going ahead for
a limited period of sixty days. The use of the peace-keeping force has been
limited to the Charter purpose of avoiding, limiting or ending breaches of
the international peace.
The group is aware that the proposed peace-keeping force will have
severe budgetary implications for the United Nations and its Members.
But having it in being, ready and able to put out a fire anywhere in the
world on twenty-four hours' notice, is the primary purpose of the United
Nations and ought to have first call on its resources.
The group has permitted itself only a few suggestions not directly related
to the peace-keeping power, but which seem to be desirable and not likely
to be controversial.
The authors have eliminated any voting on the admission of new mem-
bers if they qualify as "states" in international law, and provisions for
suspension or expulsion have been eliminated. Indeed, a description of the
United Nations as "indissoluble" has been inserted.
The Security Council has been enlarged from fifteen to seventeen mem-
bers by the inclusion, for obvious reasons, of India and Japan as permanent
members. As already noted, the veto by one permanent member has been
changed to a required affirmative vote by any fifteen members, which
means a veto by any three members, permanent or not.
Budgetary control has been tightened somewhat, and specified maximum
and minimum percentages to be borne by Members have been specified.
It has been made clear that agreements to submit disputes to arbitration,
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or to the International Court of Justice, may refer to existing disputes or to
future disputes or both.
For the sake of brevity, the major portions of the Charter and the
Statute which it is not proposed to change have not been reproduced. To
make any sense of our suggestions, the reader will thus need to have before
him a copy of the existing Charter and Statute. May he find it as challeng-
ing as have the authors.
Austin, Texas, December 8, 1972
PAUL S. FRANCIS







PEVERIL 0. SETTLE III
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The Charter of the United Nations
and
The Statute of the I.C.J.
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS
(Preamble)
... scourge of war which -4wic, repeatedly in our lifetime...
"... full powers found to be in good and due form, and through appro-
priate amendments duly adopted to the original Charter, have agreed to
the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish -as.





"1 .... to take effective o measures... (remainder of Article 1
unchanged.)
Article 2.
"The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in
Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
"1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality
of all its Members. The United Nations shall itself be a sovereign entity,
with power to sue and be sued, shall be entitled to full diplomatic immunity
to be recognized by all states, and shall have those powers and only those
powers delegated to it by its Members, by this Charter or reasonably
inferable as necessary to enable it to carry out purposes and exercise
powers specifically delegated to it by this Charter.
(Remainder of Article 2 unchanged.)





(Delete original wording entirely.)
The Members of the United Nations shall be all those states which are
now Members, plus any new Members which may join the Organization in
accordance with the provisions ofArticle 4.
Article 4.
"1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other pe 4ac-lovin
states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter. -I"
in the judgmont of tho Org'aniaation. 'wr, ale wnd willing to carrFy owt thoso
bligao
"2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United
Nations will be effeQted by a decision of th C.nr.il Assembly Upon the
recommend-ationA of the Security Coucil automatic upon notification by
that state of its desire to become a Member and its acceptance of the
obligations contained in the present Charter. If question is raised by any
three Members as to whether the new Member is in international law a
state, that question will be decided by an Advisory Opinion of the In-
ternational Court of Justice.
Article 5. (Delete)
Article 6. (Delete)
Articles 7 through 16 (Unchanged)
Article 17.
"1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the
Organization. Action by the General Assembly with regard to the budget,
whether approval, increase, decrease or any other amendment, shall be by
affirmative vote of Members who together are to contribute at least
two-thirds of that budget under the formula prepared under paragragh 2 of
this A rticle.
"2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as
apportioned by the General Assembly. This apportionment shall not re-
quire any state to bear more than twenty-five percent of the budget of the
Organization for any year, nor any six states to bear more than sixty
percent of such budget, not permit any state to bear less than one tenth of
one percent of such budget.
"3. (Unchanged).
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Article 18.
"1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.
"2. Decisions of the General Assembly ... Paragraph l(c) of Article
86, the admission of new' Members to the United N24tins, the SU&pOnSion
of the rights and priiloego of mombership, the apulsion of Member 1
questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary'
"3. (Unchanged).





"1. The Security Council shall consist of fifteciiseventeen Members of
the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, India, Japan, and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be per-
manent members of the Security Council....






"In order to promote .... with the assistance of the Militry Staff




"2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be
made by an affirmative vote of nine. ten members.
'This is to reflect the changes in Article 4 and the deletion of Articles 5 and 6. regarding
admission, suspension and expulsion of Members.
2This is to reflect the changes in Article 17.3This is to reflect the deletion of Article 47 and, in fact, the whole Military Staff
Committee apparatus.
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"3. Decisions ... affirmative vote of avIefifteen members includingthe-
concurrent votes of the permanent members provided that, in decisions
under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a
dispute shall abstain from voting and the number of affirmative votes
required for a decision of the Council shall be correspondingly reduced.
Procedure
Articles 28 through 32 (Unchanged)
Chapter VI
Pacific Settlement of Disputes
Articles 33 through 36 (Unchanged)
Article 37.
"1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Articles
33, 34, 35 or 36 fail to settle it by the means indicated in 4ha- those
Articles, they shall on the initiative of any such Party refer it to the
Security Council.
"2. Whether or not the parties have so referred it, and at any stage of
the dispute, if the Security Council deems ... action under Article 36 or to




Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace,
Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression
.Article 39 (Unchanged)
Article 40.
... measures provided for in Article 39, cal up@ order the parties
concerned.., or position of the parties concerned. Any party which fails to
obey any such order of the Security Council shall from that time be




4Specific designation of a party to a dispute as the aggressor can be useful on a number of
counts. Failure to obey a temporary restraining order of the Security Council seems good
grounds on which to attach such a label.
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Articles 43 through 45
(Delete, and substitute the following)
Article 43.
1. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force (UNPF) is established in
order to take emergency action as required to maintain or restore in-
ternational peace and security.
2. All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the
maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make avail-
able to the Secretary-General, on his call and in accordance with the
following paragraphs of this Article, armed forces, assistance, transport
and facilities, including rights of passage and land bases, necessary for the
purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
3. Non-permanent Members of the Security Council will each dispatch
one 1,000 man battalion to the current headquarters of the Command-
er-in-Chief of the UNPF for a term of three years upon each member's
election to the Security Council.5
4. Two perm'anent Members of the Security Council each year will
dispatch one 2,500 man battalion to the current headquarters of the
Commander-in-Chief of the UNPF for a term of two years; these Mem-
bers shall be determined on a rotating basis by agreement among the
permanent Members of the Security Council.
5. Thirty Members of the General Assembly who are not members of
the Security Council will each dispatch one 500 man battalion to the
current headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the UNPF for a term
of three years. Ten such contributing Members will be selected each year
by the Secretary-General with the approval of a majority of the General
Assembly.
6. The Secretary-General shall appoint an officer of general rank as
Commander-in-Chief of the UNPF. The Commander-in-Chief shall be
under the direct command of the Secretary-General of the United Nations
and shall assume full command of the UNPF in accordance with his
orders from the Secretary-General.
7. The Secretary-General shall prepare and submit to the Security
Council for its approval rules for the organization and functioning of the
UNPF.
5The make-up of the UNPF was the one point on which the group failed to reach
unanimous agreement. Professor Butte preferred a smaller standing force of UN troops.
"Hired mercenaries," cried the rest of the group, seeing real advantages in (1) a larger group,
(2) rotating membership and (3) a sense of participation to small states. Professor Butte
deferred to them.
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8. The Commander-in-Chief shall establish a corps of officers to assist
him in carrying out the responsibilities of his command. The Command-
er-in-Chief shall determine the qualifications of all officers in the UNPF
subject to the approval of the Secretary-General, and shall make recom-
mendations to the Secretary-G eneral for individual promotions. The Com-
mander-in-Chief shall be responsible for the training and duties of all
officers and ranks in or assigned to the UNPF, including the rank in which
officers shall function.
9. The Secretary-General shall select permanent bases for billeting
and training the UNPF, preferably on islands in the Pacific and Atlantic
Oceans, sovereignty over which might be acquired by the United Nations.
The Secretary-General shall designate the headquarters of the Command-
er-in-Chief.
10. All men and women, officers or ranks, for so long as they are
assigned to duty with the UNPF, shall wear the uniform of the UNPF and
shall be absolved of all allegiance other than to the United Nations. They
shall not seek or receive instructions or guidance from any person other
than their duly authorized superiors in the UNPF. At the same time, the
Commander-in-Chief and his subordinates, in assigning contingents of the
UNPF to any duty, shall bear in mind the national origin of each in-
dividual or unit to avoid embarrassment or conflict.
Article 44.
1. The Commander-in-Chief shall acquire by agreement with members
of the United Nations or by purchase all arms, armament, transport
equipment and supplies necessary to support the UNPF in its training and
in carrying out its assigned missions. The Commander-in-Chief shall en-
sure that the UNPF sustains a state of readiness to enable it to be present
as a force in being anywhere in the world within twenty-four hours after he
receives appropriate instructions.
2. The Commander-in-Chief shall advise the Secretary-General on all
questions relating to support of the UNPF, contingency plans for the
maintenance of international peace and security, and deployment of the
UNPF. The Commander-in-Chief shall present his recommended budget
to the Secretary-General on or before May 1st for the succeeding calendar
year.
Article 45.
1. Whenever the Secretary-General deems that a situation is so dan-
gerous to the international peace as to require intervention, he may give an
"alert" order to the Commander-in-Chief of UNPF, instructing him in
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detail the mission the UNPF is to undertake, and at the same time inform
the members of the Security Council that he has done so, and convene an
emergency meeting of the Security Council to meet within twelve hours. If
the Security Council does not, within twenty-four hours of the "Alert"
order, and by a vote of at least fifteen of its members, give other in-
structions to the Secretary-General, he may at or after the expiration of
such twenty-four hours give an "execute" order to the Commander-in-
Chief, which order is to be carried out immediately.
2. In preparing "Alert" and "Execute" orders the Secretary-General
shall bear in mind, and in carrying them out the Commander-in-Chief shall
bear in mind, that the primary purpose of any intervention by the UNPF is
to prevent, stop, or reduce any breaches of the international peace. It may
do this, if it will be effective, by observation of the movement of opposing
forces, or by interposing its forces between the opposing forces, and it may
use whatever force is necessary to protect itself. As representing the
sovereign power of the United Nations to avoid war, the UNPF may go
and remain, establish itself and conduct operations, anywhere in the world,
with the consent and cooperation of the relevant state or states if it is
forthcoming but without it if it is not.
3. The Secretary-General shall keep the Security Council continuously
informed of all activities of the UNPF and shall submit himself at all times
to the Security Council's instructions. Unless the Security Council shall, by
affirmative vote of at least fifteen Members, give him further authority or
different instructions within sixty days from the issuance of his "Execute"
order, he shall immediately after the expiration of such sixty days order the
Commander-in-Chief to cease all military operations and to withdraw all
UNPF forces to their base in good order as promptly as their safety will
permit it to be done.
4. At the request of the parties to any agreement for the reduction or
limitation of armaments the Secretary-General may, if he deems it feasible
without detriment to the primary purpose of UNPF, assign units of the
UNPF to perform duties of inspection, policing and reporting in con-
nection with such agreement. The cost of such assignment and perform-
ance shall be borne by the parties to the particular agreement.
5. The expense of organization, supply and maintenance of the UNPF
shall be included in the annual budget of the Organization, and this shall
include a standing appropriation of $50,000,000 to cover immediate ex-
penses of any intervention it is called on to make. The Secretary-General
is authorized to assess expenses incurred by deployment of the UNPF
against those states whose armed hostilities require the interposition of the
Force.
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"l. The Security Council ... without the authorization of the Security
Council, with the e*ceptiOn Of mfaS ze. (Delete remainder of paragraph
1).
"2. (Delete)
Articles 54 through 59
Chapter X
The Economic and Social Council
Articles 60 through 67 (Unchanged)
Article 68.
With the prior approval in each case of the General Assembly, 6 the
Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions ... (unchanged)
Articles 69 through 91 (Unchanged)
Chapter XIV





"3. Any international organization, regional or specialized agency may
become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice by filing
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations its acceptance of the
rights and obligations contained in the Statute.
Article 94.
"1. (Unchanged)
"2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent
upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have
recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it doc necary, make
reOemendation or shall decide upon measures to be taken to give effect
to the judgment.
6This was of course designed to put a brake on the proliferation of bureaux and
commissions in Geneva and elsewhere, which the group regarded as profoundly disturbing.
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Article 95.
"... Such agreements may refer to existing disputes or to future dis-
putes or both.
Articles 96 through 111 (end of Charter)
(Unchanged)
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Articles 1 through 33 (Unchanged)
Article 34.
"1. Only stateS may be parties in cases before the Court. The Court
shall have competence and jurisdiction in all disputes enumerated in Ar-
ticle 36:
a. between states, or between a state or states and the United Na-
tions;
b. between states and regional agencies or specialized agencies re-
ferred to in Articles 52 and 57 of the Charter of the United Nations;
c. between such agencies inter se;
d. between states and public bodies on the one hand and individuals
and private legal entities on the other in cases in which the parties con-
cerned have consented in advance by specific agreement to appear before







-3. When a state which is not a Memfber Of the United Nations isa
party to the eac, the Court shall in its decision fix the amount which tha4-
each party is to contribute toward the expenses of the Court in that case,
leaving out of account parties already bearing a share of the regular
expenses of the Court. This provision 9ha ll not apply if S.h stt i
bearing a share of the expenlses o f the Court.
Article 36.
"I. (Unchanged)
"2. The-states-parties to the present Statute may at any time declare
that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agree-
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ment, in relation to any Other State adopting the same obligation, the
jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
(a) the interpreation of a treaty;
(b) any question of international law;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a
breach of an international obligation or of international law;
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of
an international obligation.
(Delete paragraphs 3 and 4 and substitute the following:
"3. When any such question or questions are raised before a court or
tribunal of a member state, such court or tribunal may (and at the request
of a state which is a party or a state a national of which is a party to the
suit shall) once only request the International Court of Justice to give a
special decision thereon, and shall thereupon stay further proceedings until
the decision of the International Court is had. Such special decision shall
be accepted as controlling the legal questions within the International
Court's competency which the decision covers.
"4. The General Assembly shall select a council of three jurists, no two
of whom shall be from the same state and who shall hold office without
compensation for a period often years and may be re-elected, to be known
as the Ombudsman Council. This Council shall, in its sole discretion, have
power to request advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice




Articles 37 through 70 (end of Statute)
(Unchanged)
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